
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STAFF 9 August 1979

NOTE FOR PAO STAFF

SUBJECT: DCI's Thoughts on RMS Activities

- 1. Attached find a very interesting memorandum from the DCI on how he would like to use the resources that are assigned to PAO, PGO, and IRO.
- 2. I think you will find his comments very interesting.

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Attachment: As Stated

ACTION

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100090003-3 25X1A Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM: RMS Activities (U) SUBJECT: 1. I enjoyed our luncheon last Thursday and the opportunity just to think out loud with you and your key staff. Our conversation has stimulated me to think more on what I was trying to articulate during that conversation. I felt that I left you with a fair amount of vagueness in what I had in mind and therefore would like to elaborate on what I said there. 2. Perhaps the principal thought in my mind with respect to RMS today is the importance of PAO, PGO, and IRO dealing in more than budgetary items; and of these three offices not getting into a level of detail that should be left to the program managers. I make these points with no sense of criticism at what these offices have been covering in the past. As I mentioned to you, I draw some analogies ■office. I believe RMS is today maturing at had matured in 1965. His office about the point where had matured in 1965. His office then, in my opinion, began to get bogged down in budgetary details. In our case much will be lost if RMS doesn't help me keep an eye on \ the longer-term picture--on the woods for the trees--on where we are going as a Community. I don't have any other organization dedicated to stepping back from the fray and looking at why and what as opposed to how. Moreover, in our case, as in the more we get into 25XTA the details of how program managers go about their business, the more resistance we are going to build up. You have all done such a good job of working with the program managers that I don't want to see that pirit of cooperation compromised. 3. What do I mean, however, by looking toward the longer term? Here are a few of my views: a. How much duplicatory analysis takes place? How much is desirable? Is it in the right areas? ORIGINAL CL BY - 169947 DECL DREVW ON 7 August 1685 EXT BYND 6 YRS BY

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REASON_

- b. What is the dividing line between processing and analyzing?
- c. Which computerized information processing programs within the Community need to be compatible; are compatible?
- d. How do we define what is national and tactical? Is it the user of the data? Is it the producer of the data? Is it the general relevance of the data? Is it the unusual emergency relevance of the data? Is it the interface with other collection activities in an operational sense? Is it the interface in a managerial sense?
- e. Is the balance of effort between production and collection appropriate? Is the balance of funding between production and collection appropriate?
- f. Is the balance between different types of collection appropriate? (Careful not to conflict with CTS.)
- 4. I recognize that these kinds of problems may almost be intractable. I would suggest a bite-size approach to them, however. For instance, I wonder if we couldn't take some bit of information that was collected and follow it through the process. Who collected it? Who processed it? How soon was it disseminated? How was it disseminated? Were the computers that knew about it able to talk it disseminated? Were the computers that knew about it able to talk to each other or did it make any difference if they were? Who produced from it? Did they come to the same conclusions? Was their dissemination appropriate? Was there comparison, dialogue on the product? Were the consumers' needs satisfied by the product, and in a timely manner?
- 5. I don't know whether this clarifies or further confuses the issues that we discussed, but after you have had a chance to kick the whole thing around, let's sit down again.

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